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Abstract 
 
People are usually born into their political communities, and only a minority of them 
become member of the given community by naturalisation. Sovereign states enjoy a great 
margin of appreciation in defining the rules of both birthright and acquired political 
membership. Most states employ some form of cultural affinity-based criteria relating to 
ethnic identity that differentiate between applicants that seek to acquire the nationality of 
the state. Indeed, such distinctions seem to be growing with the revival of ethnic and 
nationalist aspirations that Europe has witnessed for some years. We argue that human 
rights principles, first and foremost non-discrimination guarantees, should be taken 
seriously and effectively applied to these cases of naturalisation, and show what such a 
scrutiny entails. While the arguments presented here should apply more generally, special 
attention will be paid to events that primarily triggered the authors’ interest, the case of 
Hungary. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Various forms of citizenship, and its legal counterpart, nationality, define membership 
in legal and political communities, but also, by this very move, define the boundaries of 
these communities, making the individual and the collective aspects inseparable. Different 
levels of governments only make sense with these communities defined. Accordingly, it is a 
question of primary importance, who has the authority to define these boundaries and 
what the possible limitations are on this power. With the growing importance of 
international and supranational human rights guarantees (most importantly the EU and the 
Council of Europe), various bodies can set limit to national citizenship policies. 
Traditionally, international law has seen nationality as belonging to the core of national 
sovereignty, the ‘domaine réservé’ of states, implying an almost complete freedom from 
external interference. Constraints apply only in cases where a state seeks international 
(legal) recognition of its relationship to an individual (above all diplomatic and consular 
protection), and even in such cases, the mere showing of an existing (genuine) connection 
seems to suffice. This requirement can be seen as a ‘positive’ element, defining when states 
can recognize someone as a national. It does not say anything about possible ‘negative’ 
limitations, where states might be obliged to recognize someone as a national, against their 
will. Here, human rights law presents a potential ground for interference with naturalisation 
policies. 
First, the ‘right to nationality’ has been codified.I Yet, this works less as a practical 
constraint on state policies (as a clear individual claim obliging a particular state would) and 
more as a general obligation of states to work towards the elimination of statelessness. 
Second, the non-discrimination principle should apply to all decisions that concern 
individual rights and obligations. As a relative principle, the non-discrimination principle 
can be placed between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ limitations on state power, establishing 
constraints that potentially cut both ways: when states should refrain from granting 
citizenship and in cases where they ought to grant recognition. Human rights standards 
have changed the landscape of national citizenship policies. It used to be a general practice, 
e.g., to differentiate between men and women, in questions of citizenship, reinforcing the 
vulnerability of women in case of divorce. States with citizenship policies that discriminate 
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against women are clear outliers. But to this day, most states continue to apply some form 
of cultural affinity-based criteria that differentiates between applicants that seek to acquire 
the nationality of the state, and there seems to be a reluctance to apply non-discrimination 
rules, with their full force, to such cases.  
The present article argues for the general application of the non-discrimination 
principle to ethnic citizenship policies. It will proceed by first introducing the role of 
citizenship in defining the political community, the ‘right’ people and, second, by analysing 
what political goals can serve as legitimate grounds for citizenship policies. We apply a 
normative, human rights test to this end. While the arguments should apply more generally, 
special attention will be paid to events that primarily triggered the authors’ interest, the case 
of Hungary. Recently the Hungarian government offered Hungarian citizenship to ethnic 
transborder Hungarians without a residency requirement. The extension of voting rights 
followed this move. The end of this paper examines the implementation of the rules 
conferring the status of citizenship for those living abroad. 
The article builds on arguments from political and legal theory as well as the relevant 
case law of the human rights international fora. It addresses arguments that can be used 
both for and against the permissibility of external ethnic citizenship, in a way that they 
could be played out, e.g., in an ECHR case with a claimant challenging the state policy and 
a respondent government defending its selectivity.II In addition to these two layers the 
paper draws on a recent empirical research, which has shown the effects of the recent 
Hungarian extension of the citizenry. This is because we believe that only the three aspects 
combined (theory, standards as applied, empirical insight) can account for the complex 
processes that sustain naturalisation policies with strong ethnic preference. The paper uses 
the terms nationality and citizenship interchangeably, if not indicated otherwise. It applies 
the adopted terminology following Brubaker on the ‘triadic nexus’ of the three players: kin 
minorities, their home states (where they reside) and their kin-states (the majority/titular 
nation of which they belong on ethnic, linguistic, religious etc. grounds) (Brubaker 1996). 
When we write about external ethnic citizenship we understand the granting of nationality 
to non-resident aliens based on an ethno-cultural criteria. By ethno-cultural, we largely 
mean the ideal group for traditional European nation-building, still alive today, defined by 
traces that might include language, religion and some kind of an imagined common 
ancestry.III  
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2. Who are the people? 
 
‘One day Japan grants equal voting rights to the citizen of Norway so that they can 
elect a small party of Norwegians to the Japanese Diet if they wish. Then the Diet by 
majority vote levies taxes on Norwegian oil and directs its transfer to Japanese refineries’ 
(Dworkin 2011: 380). This is the hypothetical example of the book of Ronald Dworkin’s 
Justice for Hedgehogs, which among others deals with the traditional question: Who are 
the people? As Dworkin emphasizes, people want to be governed by people relatively like 
themselves, and it has been taken to justify many forms of tribalism and nationalism: of 
race, religion, language, and kinship. But there is no answer to the question on who the 
right people are. This is because the ideal of democracy already presupposes a political 
community. As a default nation-states exist and their boundaries are created and altered by 
geography, accidents of history, war or politics (Dworkin 2011: 381-382). In most cases we 
have acquired the political membership by virtue of birthplace or ‘pedigree’, in other cases 
by naturalisation. But in both cases it is the state, which decides on the boundaries of the 
given community. States are allocating political membership at birth usually according to 
parentage (ius sanguinis) and territoriality (ius soli). Naturalisation is ‘the final step in the 
process of acquiring citizenship after birth’ (Shachar 2012: 1012). In order to acquire post-
birth membership in a desired country, the applicant must first reach its territory and 
establish lawful permanent residence (Shachar 2012: 1012). 
The paper accepts the Rawlsian claim that the nation-states are the primary loci of 
political legitimacy and the pursuit of justice and that the sovereignty of these states are 
constrained internally by the moral equality of individuals who are subjects of the given 
states, that is, who live in the territory of the given states (Rawls 1993: 36). The 
government must treat all its citizens as equals in the sense that political decisions and 
arrangements must display equal concern for the fate of all. Becoming a member of a 
political community is a crucial factor in the determination of life chances. The fate and life 
of the citizens of a political community are interconnected. The state’s basic political 
institutions elaborate the rules, which govern their life. Citizens pay taxes to cover the 
expenses of the political institutions, public services and the redistribution. As citizens we 
tend to give preference to each other’s interests, and sometimes this ‘preferential treatment’ 
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is justified.IV It is the principle of justice, which gives answer to the question whether the 
preferential treatment is acceptable or not in a given case.  
Members of the political community are in different situations both in terms of their 
abilities and capacities, and their social background and economic conditions. It is the duty 
of the state to improve the social and economic position of disadvantaged groups so that 
their opportunities shall be more equal. The state measure does not mean privilege, or 
giving more rights, but state intervention in order to reduce the social support of negative 
discrimination and the differences leading to it. The purpose of these measures is the 
equation of group disadvantages that is helping those who had in an unjust way got into a 
disadvantageous situation because of their belonging to a social group.  
For instance, it is justified to employ preferential treatment if a social group cannot take 
part equally in the life of the political community, possibly but not necessarily because of 
structural discrimination, and if the inefficient political power of the group has become 
steady, because then the group exists separated, isolated from the political community. 
Accordingly, the term preferential treatment is not the synonym of a justified classification 
and its goal is never to benefit certain persons. The ultimate purpose of preferential 
treatment, by definition, is the elimination of inequalities of opportunity in society. 
However, in the case of rules conferring the status of citizenship the applicants are not 
yet stakeholders of the given political community. Following Rainer Bauböck, stakeholders 
of a country could be those individuals, whose ongoing ties to the polity involve them 
deeply in its present political life and ‘whose circumstances of life link their future well-
being to the flourishing of a particular polity’ (Bauböck 2007: 2422). They can have a claim 
to membership and to participate in collective decision-making processes.  
What kind of standards should govern our relations to individuals applying for 
admission to our political community? Thomas Nagel offers universal human rights as the 
source of the constraints on the external exercise of sovereign state power (Nagel 2005: 
136). Universal human rights as an important part of international rules and institutions 
serve as limitations to the dominant sovereignty of separate nation-states. This means that 
there are principles, which should govern the nation-states’ decision-making when 
choosing the right kind of demos or extending the citizenry. For instance, a state decision 
cannot be arbitrary; it should have legitimate reason for offering a membership for those 
who live outside of the state. 
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Since Aristotle citizenship has always been associated with political relations (Shachar 
2012: 1003). It embodies a connection between the state and the individual, a legal link that 
should be a reflection of an actual relationship. This follows from the fact that nationality is 
a key element in defining the boundaries of the political community. Voting and candidacy 
are usually the privileges of nationals, and as rights they should be exercised by the right 
people. If political decision-making is seriously detached from stakeholders, this might end 
up putting the underlying political rights into risk. This is why we need standards to 
determine whether the extension of citizenry in a given case is morally right or wrong. 
This standard could be equality, which has close connections with justice in general. 
Building upon Rawls’ conception of the resource-egalitarian theory of equality, this paper 
provides normative foundations for its main thesis that common non-discrimination 
guarantees should be applied to the case of naturalisation and cultural affinity-based 
preferences. To be able to apply this principle to citizenship policies, to decide what counts 
as reasonable differentiation in state decisions on nationality, we first should establish what 
nationality is, and what it isn’t. Only in relation to this can we analyse what are the 
legitimate goals of differentiation, and what can be seen as a proportionate measure to 
achieve these goals (based on the general test applied in international as well as domestic 
human rights adjudication). The legitimate goals of nationality are thus linked to the core of 
nationality: what it means in its essence. 
 
3. What is nationality? Non-discrimination and external ethnic 
citizenship 
 
3.1. In search of standards 
This chapter applies the non-discrimination test to the case of external ethnic 
citizenship. This endeavour raises a number of preliminary questions. First, whether the 
non-discrimination test can be applied to naturalisation, a decision intimately linked to 
national sovereignty. Second, whether we can define a core meaning of nationality, against 
which we can then measure what counts as legitimate policy goal and what does not. 
Before proceeding further we should clarify what we mean with the term 
‘discrimination’. One can differentiate between three different types of discrimination. The 
first of these three dimensions involves ensuring equal treatment of equal situations and 
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prohibiting the equal treatment of manifestly unequal situations. In order to avoid 
arbitrariness, governments should determine the criteria for the distribution of the 
entitlements and benefits with the same degree of consideration of individual interest. If 
there is a challenge to the validity of the government’s policy choices, courts should judge 
the issue (e.g. tax, financial provisions) applying the reasonableness test. There should be 
an objective reason of the distinction. In the absence of such a reason, the distinction is 
arbitrary, since the affected persons were certainly not treated as persons with equal dignity. 
However, the weaker test of reasonable goal is not applicable for many characteristic cases 
of racial and ethnic discrimination and for cases that involve fundamental rights. In these 
cases it is only a test stronger than that of reasonable goal could detect that the 
classification is in fact discriminatory. 
The second dimension of discrimination is the most grievous one. Strict equality is 
called for in the legal sphere of civil rights and freedoms, since there is no justification for 
any exception. All citizens of a society must have equal basic rights and fundamental 
liberties. However, to-be stakeholders are not yet citizens of the political community, and 
they do not have a fundamental right to gain nationality in a country chosen by them. Thus 
in ethnic citizenship cases such a right (gaining citizenship) which does not belong to the 
range of fundamental rights is at stake. Nevertheless, an arbitrary allocation or denial of 
nationality might in certain cases raise a fundamental rights issue because of the impact on 
e.g. the private life of the individual.V 
Citizenship cases include many characteristic features of ethnic and sex discrimination. 
We call this discrimination based upon bias, while this third type presupposes the 
illegitimacy of any differentiated treatment due to irrelevant criteria. Since classification 
based upon ethnicity is a suspect classification, in most jurisdictions heightened scrutiny is 
required to filter out illegitimate state measures. This standard seems to form a solid basis 
against which we can measure policies of external ethnic citizenship and it works well in 
several respects: it applies a general approach and ‘forces’ governments to justify their 
policies against a normative framework. This serves the additional goal of pressuring them 
to come forward with their justifications that are in line with human rights standards.VI 
Most of the literature and the applicable case law on naturalisation and non-discrimination 
deal with the ‘negative’ aspect of naturalisation, or exclusion, about denial of citizenship to 
claimants, whereas we problematize here a ‘positive’ aspect, i.e. inclusion of groups of 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
93 
people based on ethno-cultural traits. This can also be interpreted as internal limits (whom 
states can exclude from the residents) with stricter (international) scrutiny, and external 
limits (whom states can include from among non-residents) with apparently less 
(international) scrutiny. Yet, underlining the statement that inclusion and exclusion are only 
the two sides of the same coin (Joppke 2005: 22–23), an imaginary claimant to a case 
designed following our arguments here would seek remedy for his or her exclusion for the 
lack of membership of the said groups. If the gap between the preferential and the non-
preferential track is too wide, also considering the basis of the differentiation, it can easily 
amount to discrimination based upon bias. To be sure, the non-discrimination requirement 
in itself will not outlaw all kinds of differentiation based on ethnicity, but places a heavy 
burden on the governments to justify their policies when they apply national or ethnic 
criteria. On the most general level, nationality can be described as a proxy.VII A legislative 
act defines who is a national, and other acts confer certain rights and duties on these 
nationals (and not others). It is along these lines that external ethnic citizenship has been 
defended: after all, states are free to treat citizenship as a symbolic embodiment of ethnic 
belonging. Indeed, states are largely free to decide what rights and duties are attached to 
this status. For our purposes, however, the view that maintains the extreme elasticity (or 
even emptiness) of citizenship would make it hard to define a core meaning of what 
nationality is about. There are at least two arguments that can save us from this deadlock. 
First, as we have seen, nationality is more than one status among many that links a state 
up to an individual. It is the defining membership for a political community, decisive both 
for the state (it acts in the name of whom, which peopleVIII) and for the individuals (where 
and how they can exercise their political rights). While many elements have become 
detached from nationality (non-nationals can vote, can get elected, and can now exercise 
other rights reserved, earlier, to nationals), there is still a strong connection between 
nationality and membership in the political community. State practice underlines this view 
also in the context of external citizenship: many countries that opt for an extension of the 
citizenry to co-ethnics abroad also allowing them to vote.IX This necessarily means that the 
connection is more than mere symbolism. Second, international and European legal 
provisions do circumscribe something that seems to be essential elements of nationality. 
The 1930 Hague Convention, in its Article 1, says that states are bound to recognise other 
states’ sovereign decision on whom their nationals are only insofar as this decision is in line 
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with international law.X This makes it crucial to see what states and other actors on the 
international scene see as the core meaning of nationality. The International Court of 
Justice faced this question in its 1955 Nottebohm judgement, and concluded that 
nationality should be ‘real and effective’, adding that ‘naturalisation is not a matter to be 
taken lightly.’XI This established the effective link or genuine connection criteria that have 
some bearing on what nationality is about, but all this is limited to the scope of 
international recognition. A state not respecting this principle might argue that it is aware 
of this limitation, and is willing to accept that it is only valid insofar as it remains strictly a 
connection between the individual and the state, without international ramifications. A 
more complete statement on what nationality is, in Europe, can be found in the 1997 
European Convention on Nationality.XII The very definition of nationality in the 
Convention maintains that ‘“nationality” means the legal bond between a person and a 
State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin’.XIII The Convention, both in its 
preamble and in Article 5, applies the non-discrimination principle to all questions arising 
from nationality, including distinctions based on ‘national or ethnic origin’.XIV It also 
repeats some basic principles like national sovereignty on the one hand and conditions for 
international recognition on the other. As we have seen, states have wide discretion in 
matters of nationality, of defining the boundaries of the political community. Questions of 
political philosophy arise about how states can justify their rules of exclusion and inclusion, 
but in the context of regulating (access to) nationality, this in itself rarely raises 
constitutional legal problems. One area of law that applies universally and requires such 
justifications, piercing the veil of national sovereignty, is the principle of non-
discrimination that is part of virtually all human rights instruments, on the international, 
European and national levels. The following section takes this principle seriously and 
assesses whether granting citizenship to non-residents based on ethnic preference can be 
justified along established standards, using the rights based test of requiring legitimate 
objectives (or ‘necessity’) as well as a proportionate relationship between these and the 
(mode of) interference, that is the applied classification: ‘proportionality’ or, in the parlance 
of the European Court of Human Rights, that the interference is ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’. 
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3.2. Applying the non-discrimination test 
Regardless of whether we assess impermissible discrimination in a domestic 
constitutional setting or on the international level, we can largely move along the two-
prong test of necessity and proportionality. Reconstructing the test applied by the ECtHR, 
the steps look as follows:XV 
1)  whether there has been a difference in treatment between persons in similar 
situations; 
2)  whether there is objective and reasonable justification; 
2a) whether it pursues a legitimate aim; 
2b) whether there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised. 
In the case of external ethnic citizenship policies, it will not be hard to establish that 
there is a difference in treatment: it is quite unique for states to grant citizenship to non-
resident aliens, especially if this happens in large numbers. Distinctions based on ethnicity 
will be especially suspect for the Court: ‘Where the difference in treatment is based on race, 
colour or ethnic origin, the notion of objective and reasonable justification must be 
interpreted as strictly as possible’.XVI Furthermore, in ECHR case law, rather than looking 
at mere intent or aim, the effect of the policy is enough to show that there is a difference in 
treatment (‘indirect discrimination’).XVII This will render suspect the seemingly neutral 
policies that many European states prefer to adopt when furthering the goals of their 
external ethnic citizenship policies. E.g., Romania and Hungary both apply legal clauses 
that seek to circumvent earlier border changes, in an indirect way, instead of using a direct 
ethnic condition. The Romanian clause simply talks about those who lost their nationality 
‘for reasons not imputable to them’ or ‘against their will’; the Hungarian law talks about 
applicants ‘whose ancestor was a Hungarian citizen, or whose Hungarian origin can be 
presumed’.XVIII As showing the unequal effect will suffice under ECHR case law, it is 
enough here to conclude that external ethnic citizenship policies, in their actual application, 
enforce an ethnic preference, and we do not need to go into the details of the legal wording 
and interpretation. This is anyway in line with the legislative intent, an ethnic-nationalist 
vision of the state. The question of what is behind the policies already plays into the 
justification part of the test. 
While ethnic preference triggers a stricter standard of review, the burden on the 
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responding government might also turn on the continental trends that judges might 
identify. The ECtHR has maintained that the existence of a European consensus will 
inform the decision on what counts as acceptable justification.XIX These elements are 
inherently linked to the notion of a ‘margin of appreciation’, a concept that the ECtHR 
uses to describe the leeway it allows for national governments. Far from imposing 
uniformity, the Court enforces minimum standards. While the ground of differentiation 
(ethnic origin -- in most cases, present only indirectly in external citizenship policies) causes 
the margin to shrink, the policy area, nationality, widens the margin: it is, after all, a ‘domaine 
réservé’, long recognised as belonging to the core of national sovereignty. But regardless of 
whether the margin of appreciation will be wide or narrow, states will have a large 
discretion to decide who will become their nationals and who won't. But our question is 
exactly this: where can we draw the margin, what are the limits that human rights standards 
do set, in the context of ethnic preferences? 
First we need to identify grounds for differential treatment. We should only be concerned 
with grounds that can be deemed legitimate, in line with human rights standards. Yet, in 
the case of naturalisation policy, this will not be too constraining. Almost anything other 
than outright racism would most likely suffice. Indeed, states themselves often consider 
nationality as something as a privilege more than a right.XX Let’s see, from this aspect, the 
common explicit (and prima facie acceptable) justifications for external ethnic citizenship 
policies. Governments can use two different types of justifications, either based on 
arguments why the individual deserves its nationality (individual claim/benefit) or because 
this is furthering government policies (state goal). As individual rights based arguments are 
stronger players in the field of human rights scrutiny, let’s first look into those. 
1) One could argue that individuals sharing the ethnic background of the majority 
(titular) nation of a country, regardless of whether they reside in the respective state, have a 
genuine link, an effective connection that ought to be or, at least, can be recognized, if the 
individuals so desire. Yet, when looking into what genuine link might mean, it remains 
dubious whether mere ethnic belonging would suffice, rather than being one factor among 
many that can indicate an adequately deep connection.XXI Ethno-cultural proximity might 
work, if anything, as presumption of a certain type of connection but is not enough in 
itself.XXII But let’s be more permissive and imagine for a second that we accept ethno-
cultural ties as a basis of effective link and we allow states not only to grant citizenship to 
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co-ethnics abroad, but also recognise this connection as in line with international law. The 
major problem with this view is that it would upset the delicate balance of established 
minority rights standards that maintain the primary responsibility of the home state in 
securing minority rights, and limit the kin-state’s ability to interfere directly.XXIII A 
persistent defender could still object and argue that this might not be that bad, after all. It 
seems that we give an additional layer of protection for members of a potentially vulnerable 
group. Yet, if we think of recent examples of Russian interventions that have been 
defended, among others, on grounds of ‘protecting fellow Russians’, it is easy to see how 
the first step of additional protection easily slips into a second one, contributing to an 
increased securitization of minority rights. This, in turn, is hardly beneficial for minorities 
who normally seek to fight the perception that they present an inherent danger (because 
they are potentially disloyal) to the state they live in.XXIV Not to mention the issue that 
external citizenship weakens minority claims for self-governance by increased autonomy 
(Bauböck 2007). In the Hungarian case, the rights of Hungarians who naturalise from 
Austria, Slovakia and Ukraine without taking up residency in Hungary actually diminish in 
important respects. As these countries do not allow applicants to maintain their original 
nationality, they become nationals of another country, with the additional layer of EU 
citizenship only available in two of the three cases. 
In other words it is, at best, a fallacy to think that it is an external measure, non-
resident naturalisation that can address the ills of minority life.XXV Getting back to our 
original question of justification, it remains questionable whether the ethnic link would be 
enough to defend external citizenship policies from criticism concerning their legal 
justifications. 
2) State governments can apply a somewhat more refined version of the ethnic 
argument and could argue that granting citizenship is simply a form of recognition that had 
earlier been denied from co-ethnics residing abroad. They share their ‘national identity’ 
with the majority of the kin-state, it should only be permissible to acknowledge that with 
official documents, that can include a passport, attesting their ‘national belonging’, having 
their names printed on their mother tongue (‘written as it should be’). Many of these claims 
are more than legitimate. The primary function of minority rights is exactly to secure that 
these claims (e.g., right to recognition, right to use one’s name) are met – by the home 
state. The kin-state’s ability is, for both legal and technical reasons, limited in this sense.XXVI 
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We have seen earlier that external citizenship as a replacement or additional guarantee for 
minority rights contradicts some basic tenets of the present system. Furthermore, we have 
seen that nationality, according to the established legal view, is more than symbolism. 
While states can adopt policies that counter this, they can hardly use this deviation to 
justify their policies against external (domestic or international) human rights review. 
3) State governments can still point to patterns of oppressive policies, persistent 
violations in home states, against which they seek to grant protection, remedying existing 
discrimination. After all, refugee law and, more recently, the concept of the Responsibility 
to Protect both seem not only to legitimise but also require the protection of third states. 
Yet, it is easy to see how the grounds of justification diverge in these cases. External 
protection is legitimate insofar as, in the individual case, it has been established that this is 
necessary: there has been a violation of human rights. We should not forget that in all of 
these cases, there is a national sovereignty argument on the other side, too (just like with 
the external citizenship policy of the kin-state): the home state could argue on similar 
grounds against external intervention in its relationship with its own resident citizen. 
Furthermore, diplomatic and consular protection in the case of dual nationals is limited by 
the principle of effective nationality, which defeats the goal of extending citizenship so as 
to provide some kind of external protection. 
So it seems that while states might be free to adopt policies on general (not 
individualised) arguments of discrimination by home states, these cannot stretch existing 
boundaries and go against the sovereignty of home states. Just like we have seen earlier 
with minority rights based arguments, a contrary position would question the current setup 
of the international minority rights regime. 
4) State governments could point to actual discrimination flowing from past injustices. 
In the Hungarian and Romanian case, the argument could go, former citizens were denied 
nationality. Hungary recognises descendants of its nationals as nationals, regardless of the 
number of generations, the ratio of Hungarian national ascendants, linguistic skills or, most 
importantly, residence. In contrast, this ‘line of inheritance’ is broken in the case of former 
nationals (and their descendants) that lost their Hungarian nationality as a result of the 
borders moving over their heads. As a direct result undoing this potentially expands the 
citizenry to ‘Greater Hungary’ and maybe beyond. Similarly, Romania grants nationality, 
through ‘reacquisition’, to former nationals that lived in ‘Greater Romania’.XXVII ECHR 
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case law recognizes and might even require the correction of ‘factual inequalities’.XXVIII 
The fallacy in these arguments follows that in earlier justifications: governments try to 
legitimise their policies by contrasting them with policies that they adopted themselves. 
Extending the citizenry through an indefinite line of generations, while permissible, hardly 
seems to be normatively justifiable. States might feel free to adopt such measures, but they 
can hardly use them as arguments to justify their otherwise questionable policies. 
5) As we have indicated, external citizenship policies might be justified based on other 
basis than individual claims, showing that they serve legitimate state policy goals. Linking 
co-ethnics might be part of a fully legitimate immigration policy that takes into account 
demographic and economic reasons as well as an expectation of a certain degree of social 
integration. Immigration and naturalisation policies can use ethnicity, linguistic skills and 
other cultural elements as a crude predictor of social integration. A suspect classification 
can thus become a legitimate part of a policy measuring cultural proximity. The only 
problem is that this justification as a stated policy goal goes against the policy itself, both in 
rhetoric and in its actual form. If social integration is the goal and kins migrate, that would 
frustrate the goal of ‘Greater Hungary/Romania’, emptying the ‘targeted territories’ of co-
ethnic population. Furthermore, concerning the prominent omission of the residence 
requirement, it is hard to explain why states do not use their leverage of the easy access to 
citizenship to actually attract these people. 
6) Finally, governments could argue that, in a post-national phase, seeking to virtualize 
state borders, their policies are fully in line with what the EU seeks to build: a common 
space, a truly multicultural universe where national identities are freely recognized. The 
issue with this argument is that it seeks to slip through the part of the policy that is 
problematized in the first place by the non-discrimination standard. Rather than a truly 
European project of virtualizing borders, external ethnic citizenship policies draw new 
borders based on ethnic belonging. Contrary to the goal of justifying external citizenship 
policies, this argument is hardly more than a recognition of the goal of discrimination. The 
government that argues against homogenization in the home states ends up seeking the 
same type of internal homogeneity among its citizenry. 
This will not render, however, all distinctions based on ethnicity (or ‘cultural affinity’) 
discriminatory. While we can ponder how far liberal constitutional regimes can go in 
seeking to maintain or establish some sort of internal homogeneity, in a legal assessment 
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most of the resulting policies will pass the human rights tests commonly applied today, also 
considering that states will have some margin of appreciation. 
Differentiation based on linguistic skills, familial connections, some degree of ‘cultural 
knowledge set’ (sought to be assessed in naturalisation tests) will most likely favour 
applicants who are closer, culturally, to the ideal citizen of the policy maker. Asking for a 
fee to start the procedure and the requirement of adequate resources (means of 
subsistence, trying to make sure that newly naturalised citizens will not be an undue burden 
on the welfare system) will disfavour the less wealthy. Yet, in themselves, these will most 
likely not constitute human rights violations, provided that the non-preferential 
naturalisation is kept adequately open for applicants who do not qualify for (ethno-cultural) 
preferential treatment. 
Consider a case where the government of the home state is not opposed to the external 
citizenship of its resident nationals that belong to an ethnic minority group (as is the case 
with Hungarians living in Romania). Let’s accept for a moment that arguments 
(justification no. 2 above) based on nationality as an expression of ‘national identity’ and on 
a view that non-resident kins following the political news of the kin-state, subject to 
cultural, linguistic and other policies of the kin-state targeting co-ethnics abroad justify the 
extension of the citizenry. Why would that go against any doctrine established in the name 
of human rights considerations? 
To see why even this scenario is problematic, we need to move beyond the grounds of 
justification and move to a more demanding element to the test, proportionality. 
Proportionality is a relational term that requires in this case a proportionate relationship 
between the legitimate policy goal and the means employed, that is, the grounds of 
classification. In cases when fundamental rights are not at stake and the classification 
applied is not suspect it is sufficient to apply the weaker test of reasonable goal. However, 
giving ethnic preference for non-residents, e.g., as a recognition of their ‘national identity’ 
automatically means a differentiation based upon an immutable characteristic (ethnicity). 
Heightened scrutiny is appropriate, which requires a necessary relationship between 
classification and the compelling state goal, there should be no less discriminatory way to 
achieve the objective. Although to avoid underinclusivity (where all persons with the trait 
contribute to the harm but others do too) and overinclusivity (where all that contribute to 
the harm have the trait but some with the trait do not contribute) is important in every type 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
101 
of differentiation, it is even more crucial in cases of suspect classification. A substantially 
overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the claim of the legislator 
that the classification serves legitimate political ends (Stone et al. 1996: 751). Regardless of 
which justification we accept from the list that we have seen earlier, we will see both 
underinclusivity and overinclusivity. Ethno-cultural proximity will be only a crude predictor 
both for potential social integration and for how invested someone is in the political 
community (following the stakeholder concept), leaving people out who should qualify 
and, at the same time, including people who would not qualify. While governments 
routinely apply such loose standards, in the case of ethnic preference, such laxity might 
prove to be fatal, regarding the non-discrimination test. This, in turn, will also depend on 
what is at stake: what difference does it make to be in or out of the preferential group? 
A substantial view should then consider not only the external citizenship policy, taken 
in isolation, but also its relationship to the non-preferential track of naturalisation. This is 
why it matters how ‘open’ non-preferential naturalisation is. If the ground for 
differentiation (ethno-cultural proximity, through legislative assumptions and the way it is 
assessed in practice) cannot justify the distance between the preferential and the non-
preferential track, the policy will fail the proportionality test and should be seen as 
discriminatory.XXIX In the Hungarian case, the non-preferential track includes a 3+8-year 
residency requirement (considering the registration of settlement in addition to the number 
of years required by the law directly applicable to naturalisations), while the ethnic 
preference gives full exemption from the condition of residency, allowing applicants to 
naturalise without having visited the country. Applicants relying on the ethnic preference 
have additional benefits like not being required to prove the means of subsistence and 
housing or to take the naturalisation test. 
We argued that it is justified to take the non-discrimination principle seriously and 
apply the test to naturalisation policies, including external ethnic citizenship policies. Our 
analysis now concludes that once we take this route, it is hard to stop short of declaring 
such ethnic preference in violation of the non-discrimination principle, especially if access 
to citizenship for residents otherwise remains highly restrictive. 
So far we have examined justifications that are the most likely to succeed on a non-
discrimination test. As these considerations show, however, what is really working in the 
background is a nation-building project that seeks to revisit history, to the extent possible 
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(ie., without directly questioning existing state borders), and (‘re-’) establish a desired past 
through the means of citizenship policies. As the Hungarian case shows, these goals can go 
hand-in-hand with more direct political aims benefiting certain parties that seek to secure a 
loyal voting base with the extension of those eligible to vote, in which case justification 
under any human rights test is hardly an option. 
 
4. Case study of  Hungary 
 
4.1. Legislative history 
Our aim in this chapter is to have a deeper understanding of how direct political aims 
play into policy decisions and reasoning, an insight that should inform our judgment on the 
legitimacy of naturalisation norms. 
The case study focuses on Transylvania, the region where most of those concerned by 
the new policy live. It is a part of Romania, with a Hungarian minority population of 
approximately 1.2 million. Two-thirds of all applications for preferential naturalisation and 
three-fifths of the applications for registration as a voter in the 2014 general elections came 
from here.XXX In addition, Romania recognises dual citizenship policy and it has large 
minorities in its neighbouring countries which gives us the possibility to compare the two 
countries’ attitudes towards its minorities. After World War I as a result of the Trianon 
Peace Treaty Hungary lost nearly 75 per cent of its territory and around 33 per cent of 
ethnic Hungarians found that they no longer lived in Hungary. This trauma was followed 
by the revisionist interwar era and the years of socialism. In the bipolar world the rigidities 
of the global order made the question of the minorities became taboos. In the Central and 
Eastern European region only bilateral agreements ensured the rights of minorities 
including a weak guarantee of ‘classic’ core rights (Venice Commission 2002: Chapter B). 
The implementation of these agreements depended on the given government. Later on the 
newly adopted democratic constitutions incorporated the relevant international human 
rights principles. In addition to these guarantees and the role of the home state, 
emphasized by the international standards, the kin-state, Hungary has also tried to play an 
active role. For instance, with the 1989 amendment of the Constitution of Hungary the so-
called ‘responsibility clause’ was built in, expressing its responsibility for the fate of ethnic 
kin in neighbouring countries – itself a trend in the Central and Eastern European 
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region.XXXI After stormy political debates Hungary adopted the Act LXII of 2001 on 
Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (Status Law) with an overwhelming 
parliamentary majority (Halász and Majtényi 2002; Küpper 2004: 313.). The goal of the 
Law, with reference to the responsibility clause, was to create direct links to transborder 
ethnic Hungarians. It aimed ‘to promote and preserve’ transborder Hungarians’ ‘well-being 
and awareness of national identity within their home country’ and to ‘ensure undisturbed 
cultural, economic and family relations’.XXXII The Status Law issued a certificate, called a 
‘Certificate of Hungarian Nationality’ for ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Romania and Ukraine providing certain benefits on an 
individual basis in Hungary. Several religious and civil organizations as well as the offices of 
the RMDSZ (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania)XXXIII took part in 
implementing the Status Law. The Status Law caused widespread uproar amongst 
neighbouring countries. Although Romania had its own Status Law, the country felt, with 
6.6 per cent of Hungarians, that its territorial integrity was threatened, and it considered the 
Law to be an interference with its national, internal affairs. 
International bodies like the Council of Europe Venice Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe have criticized 
the Status Law. As for the principle of territorial sovereignty, the Venice Commission was 
of the opinion that in fields not covered by international treaties or customs, the consent of 
the home State should be explicit to the kin-State measures on the preferential treatment of 
its kin-minorities (Venice Commission 2002: Chapter D). In the given case, Romania had 
not been consulted prior to the adoption of the measure, although the Status Law affected 
its internal affairs. In addition, the Venice Commission found that part of the Status Law, 
which authorised semi-official organisations (such as the local representatives of the World 
Federation of Hungarians, WFH)XXXIV of the kin-state to implement its regulations in the 
home state particularly troublesome.XXXV Moreover, the ethnic targeting of the Status Law 
was held discriminatory. According to the Status Law the mere declaration of being 
Hungarian sufficed.XXXVI The Commission found problematic that it appeared that the 
organisations representing the Hungarian national community in the neighbouring 
countries had to investigate the applicant’s national background before issuing – or 
refusing – the relevant recommendation. However, it was not specified in the law what 
criteria they should apply (Venice Commission 2002: Chapter D/a/ii). The European 
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Parliament also criticised the Law. Eric Jürgens, rapporteur of the EP concluded that the 
Law was ‘discriminatory and has extraterritorial implications, and recommended that 
Hungary should rescind the Law.’XXXVII On behalf of the OSCE Rolf Ekeus High 
Commissioner for National Minorities highlighted the concern according to which the 
state can only act within its jurisdiction, meaning its territory and citizenry.XXXVIII The 
Hungarian Parliament had to amend the Status Law in order to be in compliance with the 
above international standards. And although the Romanian government gave its consent to 
the amended Status Law, the institutions of foreign Hungarians, first and foremost the 
WFH, were dissatisfied. Other organisations in the neighbouring countries also expressed 
the need for dual citizenship. For instance, the RMDSZ in Romania and the Democratic 
Party of Vojvodina Hungarians in Serbia collected signatures and negotiated with the 
Hungarian Government about the possibility of having Hungarian nationality. However, at 
that time no Hungarian parliamentary party was supportive of the idea, the officials of the 
right-wing Fidesz government argued that the Status Law was introduced instead of 
extending citizenship, which would be ‘almost impossible’ (Gál 2002: 114). 
On 1 May 2004 Hungary – together with some of the neighbouring countries – joined 
the European Union, but Romania was expected to become a member only at a later stage. 
Fearing that a different kind of ‘Iron Curtain’ (Waterbury 2010: 10) would cut off 
Hungarians in Romania from the homeland, a discussion has started on the possibility of 
external citizenship. 
In 2003 the World Federation of Hungarians came up with the initiative of a 
referendum, and on 5 December 2004 a referendum was held to grant citizenship to 
transborder ethnic Hungarians.XXXIX The WFH collected signatures for the referendum, 
which indicates that at the beginning it was not backed by political parties. It took some 
time for the right-wing party Fidesz – which previously initiated to adopt the Status Law – 
to support the referendum. Fidesz’s answer to the investigation of the Council of Europe 
can explain this. Two years earlier Fidesz committed itself not to extend citizenship rights 
to the Status Law.XL The then ruling majority, the socialist-liberal coalition was against the 
referendum all along. The left-wing parties emphasized mainly the possible cost of the 
country’s welfare reform and the probable instability in the region. The possible 
appearance of new members in the Hungarian political community and its political 
influence could have been also feared (Kovács 2005: 55-60). After months of negative 
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campaigning the result was an invalid referendum. 33 per cent of eligible voters appeared, 
51.57 per cent voted in favour of the question (Tóth and Kovács 2007: 144). The 
referendum failed, which was an unforgivable disappointment for the transborder ethnic 
Hungarians. In 2010 the right-wing Fidesz party won the parliamentary elections and 
shortly afterwards it started to promote strongly, in the words of Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán, the ‘reunification of the Hungarian nation which was torn apart by the Trianon 
Peace Treaty’.XLI It was symbolic that the Act XLV of 2010 on the Testimony for National 
Cohesion and the amendment of Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Nationality were the first 
steps taken by the newly elected government. The Act on National Cohesion declared that 
all members and communities of the Hungarian nation, subjected to the jurisdiction of 
other states, belong to the single Hungarian nation.XLII The amendment of the Act on 
Hungarian Nationality sought to target ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary, 
amending an already existing preferential naturalisation clause and removing the residency 
requirement. The preferential track allows applicants to naturalise if they demonstrate that 
their ancestor was a Hungarian national, or their origin from Hungary can be presumed 
and further provide proof of a sufficient knowledge of the Hungarian language.XLIII In 2011 
a new Constitution, called the Fundamental Law was adopted, including a revised 
responsibility clause. The responsibility clause appeared in the very first sentence of the 
preamble and has been expanded in Article D authorising the Hungarian authorities to take 
action abroad in favour of transborder ethnic Hungarians.XLIV Shortly afterwards Hungary 
provided voting rights to its transborder citizens.XLV As a result suffrage is no more subject 
to registered residence in Hungary. Thereby voters who have never lived in the country 
could influence general elections.XLVI 
Basically we are witnessing a linear development from 2010 till nowadays. The two-
third parliamentary majority changed the concept of the nation (Körtvélyesi 2012: 111), 
indicating a change in the country’s relation to the ethnic transborder Hungarians. The use 
of the concept of ethnic nation in the Fundamental Law, together with the amendment of 
the Citizenship Act and the General Elections Act could be understood as part of a 
resurgence of ethno-cultural nationalism. As Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the 
policy towards ethnic Hungarians Zsolt Semjén phrased it, the extension of the citizenry 
and voting rights to ethnic Hungarians without a residency requirement, meant ‘the 
reunification of the nation through the legal system’.XLVII In a statement made before the 
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general elections of 2006 the then vice president of Fidesz, István Mikola revealed that the 
extension of the citizenry and voting rights could have cemented the governance of Fidesz 
(Mikola 2006). Accordingly, the expressed goal of enfranchising Hungarian minorities was 
to ensure the survival of the ‘one single Hungarian nation’ (Fundamental Law) consisting 
of ethnic Hungarians living anywhere in the region and to secure its own power for twenty 
years. 
 
4.2. Implementing the new external citizenship policy 
In what follows we seek to go deeper into the goals that the legislation actually serves 
with the extension of citizenship and voting rights. As justification constitutes an essential 
part of the non-discrimination test, here we provide some empirical insights into the 
functioning of the new policy, as it can be perceived by the target population. First, we 
evaluate the implementation of the measures concerning the extension of citizenship. 
Second, we focus on the execution of measures concerning the extension of voting rights. 
The 2010 measures concerning the extension of citizenship have simplified the 
administrative process, resulting in a short, three-month routine procedure, that requires 
filling some forms and the collection of (birth, marriage and death) certifications proving 
connection to an ascendant with links to Hungary, as required by the Act, and a 
handwritten CV in Hungarian (a standardized language test is not part of the process). 
Applications can be submitted within the country to the regional representatives of the 
Office of Immigration and Nationality; registrars; and to the government agencies. Outside 
of Hungary the consul as the direct representative of Hungary is the person in charge of 
the process. Should the consul accept the application, it goes to the Minister of Justice, 
who submits it to the President of the Republic. The President is responsible to issue the 
certificate of naturalisation. The naturalised person acquires Hungarian citizenship on the 
day of the oath or pledge of allegiance.XLVIII In order to implement the measures on 
preferential naturalisation a complete network was set up in Transylvania. The Hungarian 
Ministry of Justice and the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (National Council), 
a civic organisation supporting the Hungarian minority agreed to lay down the framework. 
Back in 2009 the main aim of the National Council was to achieve autonomy and to 
preserve the integrity of the Hungarians in Transylvania. With this goal in mind, the 
Council offered its support to the Hungarian minorities in Transylvania regardless of their 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
107 
political views. The National Council wished to take the special role as a conciliator 
between the Transylvanian Hungarian politics and the main public figures. This situation 
changed substantially after the right-wing Fidesz government came into power in 2010 in 
Hungary. The National Council set up the new network, called ‘Democracy Centres’ and 
established a new party under Romanian law, the Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania 
(People’s Party).XLIX The Democracy Centres were established in order to facilitate ‘the 
reunification process’; they sought to change what they saw as the failed politics of the last 
20 years in Romania.L Since the 1989 democratic transition RMDSZ has represented the 
Hungarian minority in Romania’s political life, sanctioned by votes from the Hungarian 
minority living in Romania. The National Council and later the People’s Party were 
founded to be the political rivals of RMDSZ, with active support from the Hungarian 
right-wing government. The truly close relationship between the Hungarian Government 
and the newly established Transylvanian actors caused significant deficiencies in the 
operation of the National Council and the Democracy Centres. In order to sketch this 
fairly knotty situation we chose to conduct interviews with the employees of the People’s 
Party, the National Council and the Democracy Centres in Cluj. Eleven interviews were 
conducted in 2011 at the National Council, in its regional offices, in the offices of the 
Democracy Centres and People’s Party in Cluj. We talked to the Executive Director 
responsible for financial and organisational matters of the National Council as well as 
administrators in regional offices of the National Council. Employees of the Democracy 
Centres responsible for implementing the naturalisation process were also interviewed, as 
well as the Head of Secretariat of the People’s Party who talked about his experience in 
connection with the preferential naturalisation. 
The interviews shed light on confusion of duties, responsibilities, facilities and budgets 
of the different organisations. The Head of the Secretariat of the People’s Party was 
responsible both for managing the People’s Party office, and for the hotline of the 
Democracy Centre.LI Employees of the National Council are formally hired by the offices 
of the Democracy Centres; yet, they were at the same time in charge of the duties of the 
People’s Party. The Executive Director responsible for the financial and organisational 
matters of the National Council’s office admitted that their job focused primarily on 
National Council cases, but in their spare time they also dealt with People’s Party related 
issues.LII As per the financial support concerns, the Executive Director made it clear that 
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neither Hungarian nor Romanian organisations financed the People’s Party directly. The 
People’s Party itself did not even have any employee. The Director also confirmed that it 
was the National Council which received financial support from the Hungarian State. 
These interviews lead us to the conclusion, however, that due to the intense 
relationship between the National Council and the People’s Party, financing a civic 
organisation (the National Council) meant a Hungarian governmental support to a 
Romanian Party. 
The amalgamation of the three organisations frustrated the goals of the National 
Council to support everyone regardless of their political views. The Democracy Centres 
failed to comply with their duties other than providing support connected to the 
naturalisation. They were meant to assist the applicants in submitting a naturalisation 
request, however, in practice, employees were filling out the complete application forms 
and book appointments at the Consulate, and sometimes they also helped to complete the 
handwritten CVs. This meant that the same employees had full control over the process, 
also being able to filter applicants. The official explanation was that the organisations 
representing Hungary beyond the borders were in position of investigating the applicant’s 
Hungarian knowledge before submitting the application package to the Consulate. In 
reality, the process seems to be used to gain support for a political party in two respects. 
First, by showing that the implementation of the law is in the hands of people connected to 
the People’s Party that is close to the Hungarian ruling party but not supported by the 
majority of the Hungarian voters in Romania. Even if we accept that these employees can 
act in the name of the Hungarian state in such a way, the confusion of duties that we 
encountered puts into question the neutrality of the process that one could expect from a 
state procedure to accept new nationals. Second, by providing funds which in part were 
used for political campaigns in the Romanian elections. The network of the three 
organisations exercised state power extraterritorially and they worked under political 
influence coming from the Hungarian ruling party. All this seems to frustrate the goal of 
genuine reunification, and looks more like exporting political divisions from Hungary. 
Last but not least we sketch out what role the discussed organisations played in 
connection with the extension of voting rights. The strong relationship between the 
Hungarian Government and the People’s Party can hardly pass unnoticed.LIII The People’s 
Party campaigned for a year to get transborder Hungarians register and it offered help 
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during the elections as well. On the day of the 2014 general elections the number of the 
transborder registered voters was 193,793, out of which 66.42 per cent participated in the 
elections. 128,429 voting slips proved to be valid, and 122,638 voted for Fidesz.LIV It was 
with the help of these votes that the right-wing Fidesz gained again the constitution-
amending two-thirds majority of the seats in the Hungarian Parliament. The People’s Party 
together with the National Council helped to deliver two-thirds of the registrations and 
almost two-thirds of the Transylvanian votes. 
As we have seen earlier by extending the citizenry one of the main aims of the 
Hungarian ruling party was exactly this: to cement its own power for a longer period. The 
idea to extend the citizenry beyond the state borders is not a new one; it actually marks a 
regional trend, a model that was certainly known before the Hungarian decision-makers. 
The ruling parties of Hungary’s neighbouring countries have also counted on the external 
votes, e.g., in 2007 in Croatia, 10 per cent of the voters participated in the general elections 
were transborder citizens. Or, in the 2009 Romanian presidential elections, the external 
votes came from transborder citizens living in Moldova and Ukraine helped Traian Basescu 
to be elected as president (Pogonyi et al. 2010: 14-15). However the move was used to 
provide support not only to one civic organisation (the National Council) but also to a 
political party established and operated under Romanian law. This was holding the People’s 
Party up, which in exchange launched a major political campaign benefiting Fidesz. 
However, the consequences are disturbing. The governmental aim of uniting the 
Hungarian nation certainly failed as a result of the recently launched preferential 
naturalisation process. We would not be able to count on one hand how many different 
groups of Hungarians can now be identified in Transylvania, from the perspective of 
Hungarian law adopted by the various Fidesz governments. There are ethnic Hungarians 
who live in Transylvania as Romanian citizens, there are Status Hungarians, the ones with 
dual (Hungarian-Romanian) nationality; those who registered to vote, those who voted, 
and those who did not. Indeed, one explanation to the high number of votes going to 
Fidesz in 2014, in addition to gratitude for the extension of citizenship, is that the road to 
Hungarian elections is multi-layered. Not all ethnic Hungarians are interested in getting 
non-resident nationality, even less consider that they should participate in the elections of a 
neighbouring country, the Hungarian kin-state, so not all of them register for voting, and 
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even less actually cast a vote. LV This works as a filter that can easily be biased towards 
those who are anyway motivated by the nationalist rhetoric of Fidesz. 
As a result, the Hungarian Government exported the Hungarian political divisiveness 
beyond the borders and it managed to organise and support a well-structured system for 
this in Romania. In addition, the Hungarian Government, by trying to earn support for 
itself and for the newly established People’s Party, did not take the will of the ethnic 
Hungarians in Transylvania seriously, as it used the naturalisation process to provide 
support for a particular political party in Romania. This is in itself problematic, but also 
questions the sincerity of the Hungarian Government in demanding territorial autonomy 
for the Hungarian minority group in Transylvania.LVI 
According to László Kövér, Speaker of the Parliament of Hungary, from 2014, the 
Parliament is more than a national assembly, since it is the first one that represents the 
whole nation.LVII This sounds like a break with the notion that the notion of the cultural 
nation (‘the whole nation’ here) applies to all regardless of citizenship, and this 
understanding certainly contravenes the goal of reunification. The majority of ethnic 
Hungarians living in neighbouring countries did not apply for Hungarian citizenship 
and/or did not register for voting. The quoted statement seems to push these people 
outside of the national community described as ‘the whole nation’. 
  
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we argued that the general non-discrimination test should be applied to 
naturalisation policies, including external ethnic citizenship policies. Since classification 
based upon ethnicity is a suspect one, heightened scrutiny is required to filter out 
discriminative state measures. The relevant normative, human rights test examines whether 
the ethnic classification applied is proportionate to the legitimate aim. Therefore, the paper 
looked into possible goals (ethno-cultural ties as genuine link, nationality as an expression 
of ‘national identity’, oppressive policies of the home state, remedying discrimination 
flowing form the past, social integration, virtualising borders) the state can legitimately seek 
to achieve by implementing external ethnic citizenship policies. These are the possible 
justifications that are the most likely to succeed on a non-discrimination test. However, in 
addition to these prima facie acceptable justifications for external ethnic citizenship policies, 
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illegitimate policy goals can be identified, which are not relevant for the non-discrimination 
test, as they would immediately fail the scrutiny. Often what is really working in the 
background is a nation-building project that seeks to revisit history, to the extent possible, 
and (‘re-’) establish a desired past through the means of citizenship policies. One of the 
main goals of the recent extension of citizenry and voting rights in Hungary was the 
‘reunification of the Hungarian nation’. However, Hungary’s external citizenship regulation 
and its implementation did not help to create unity rather it caused divisiveness. The 
majority of transborder ethnic Hungarians did not apply for Hungarian citizenship and/or 
did not register for voting. The applied policy and the implementation process seem to 
push these people outside of the national community described as the whole nation. All 
this seems to frustrate the goal of genuine reunification, and looks more like exporting 
political divisions from Hungary and seeking to secure a loyal voting base. 
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I See Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
II The EU law will not be addressed here directly. We try to build on principles that apply generally, outside 
the quite specific case of the EU. Many countries applying similar policies are not EU Member States. 
III Dumbrava writes most recently, along the same lines, about ‘public relatives’ (Dumbrava 2014: 47). 
IV Many constitutional courts apply the term positive discrimination, in the European Union it is positive action, in 
Canadian legal literature positive policy, and in the United States it is called affirmative action, preferential treatment or 
reverse discrimination. In the present article we are using the term preferential treatment. With this term we 
mean those measures that give an advantage to individuals on the basis of their belonging to certain national 
or ethnic minorities or a social group in a special, disadvantageous situation. 
V See, e.g. Karassev v. Finland, no. 31414/96, ECHR 1999-II. 
VI This is already a huge achievement in the case of the secrecy and non-contestability of naturalisation 
decisions, as is the case with Hungary. 
VII See the legal dimension of citizenship in Carens 2000: 162, cited in Dumbrava 2014: 6: ‘a formal status that 
links individuals to particular states and preconditions a set of rights and duties” (emphasis added). 
VIII See Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address: ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’. 
IX For instance, Hungary and Romania allow external naturalisation combined with non-resident voting rights, 
Croatia has a sizeable non-resident voting kin population as well as Italy, applying a separate regime for 
voting external citizens. Furthermore, it is not exceptional that external votes turn out to be decisive. For a 
broader overview, see Pogonyi et al. 2010. 
X ‘It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by 
other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the 
principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality.’ Art. 1., Convention On Certain Questions 
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, The Hague, 12 April 1930. 
XI Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) ICJ, No. 18 General List (1955), p. 24. 
XII European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe, No. 166, Strasbourg, 6 November 1997. 
XIII Art. 2.a, European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe, No. 166, Strasbourg, 6 November 
1997. Note that this, in itself, does not mean that the person’s ethnic origin cannot be taken into 
consideration either. 
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XIV ‘The rules of a State Party on nationality shall not contain distinctions or include any practice which 
amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour or national or ethnic origin.’ Art. 5.1, 
European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe, No. 166, Strasbourg, 6 November 1997. 
XV See, e.g. Kuric and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 386, ECHR 2012. 
XVI See Kuric and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 386, ECHR 2012, citing Oršuš and Others v. 
Croatia [GC], no. 15766/03, § 156, ECHR 2010. 
XVII See D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, § 175, ECHR 2007. 
XVIII Art. 11(1), Act No. 21/1991 on Romanian Nationality as republished, with amendments, on 10 February 
2010, for an English version, see http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/ROM%20Citizenship%20Law%201991%20%28English_consolidated%20
version%2017%20June%202010%29.pdf; Art. 4(3), Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Nationality, as amended 
by Act XLIV of 2010, for a bilingual version, see http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/HUN%20Act%20LV%20of%201993%20%28as%20of%20Jan%202009,%
20English%29.pdf. 
XIX See, e.g. Kuric and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 387, ECHR 2012, citing Ünal Tekeli v. 
Turkey, no. 29865/96, § 54, ECHR 2004-X. 
XX For some European examples see Dumbrava 2014: 40-41. Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
[GC], no. 27996/06, 34836/06, ECHR 2009, for the relevant statement on necessity and proportionality, see 
§ 46. 
XXI See the list based on the considerations of the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm decision: ‘a 
legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and 
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties’. Nottebohm, ICJ Reports 1955, p. 23, 
cited in the Explanatory Report of the European Convention on Nationality, para. 22. ‘At the time of his 
naturalization does Nottebohm appear to have been more closely attached by his tradition, his establishment, 
his interests, his activities, his family ties, his intentions for the near future to Liechtenstein than to any other 
State?’, Nottebohm, p. 24. 
XXII See the ‘social integration’ arguments under 5 below. 
XXIII For accounts driven by similar concerns, see Bolzano Recommendations 2008 and Venice Commission 
2002. 
XXIV For an elaborate discussion on the problem of securitization, with examples from the region we are 
discussing here, see Kymlicka 2007: 182-195, concluding that whenever the ‘security card’ is played, it trumps 
minority rights. 
XXV See e.g. Bárdi 2004, talking about external citizenship as an illusion, the ‘blue bird of hope’. 
XXVI For an overview of what kin-states can do, see Venice Commission 2002. 
XXVII For more details on these policies, see, respectively, Tóth and Kovács 2013; Iordachi 2013; Barbulescu 
2013. ECHR case law recognizes and might even require the correction of ‘factual inequalities’. See the 
principled invoked in the context of nationality in Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, [GC], no. 26828/06, § 388, 
ECHR 2012. 
XXVIII See the principled invoked in the context of nationality in Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, [GC], no. 
26828/06, § 388, ECHR 2012. 
XXIX It is a separate question whether this violation is remedied through levelling down, easing the rules for 
non-preferential applicants, or by levelling up, hardening the requirements for the preferential track, or else 
by doing a bit of both. 
XXX 330,970 out of 500,097 applications for preferential naturalisation 
http://www.allampolgarsag.gov.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=274:hirek130909&ca
tid=1:friss-hirek&Itemid=50 and 99,628 out of 128,712 applications for registration as a voter came from 
Romania. http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/766/766_5_1.html. 
XXXI Art. 6(3) ‘The Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living 
outside its borders and shall promote and foster their relations with Hungary.’ For a list of ‘national 
responsibility clauses’, see Pogonyi et al. 2010: 3; Halász and Majtényi 2002: 135-144. Most of these countries 
introduced so-called ‘status laws’ for external kin minorities, see Bauböck 2007: 2396. 
XXXII Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, Chapter II Article 4. 
XXXIII RMDSZ is a Hungarian Party in Romania with the largest number of supporters; several times a 
governing party in Romania from 1996. 
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XXXIV The WFH is a specific, marginalized organization without strong internal support, and not very well 
integrated into domestic Hungarian policies. Its ambition is to join all the Hungarians in the World, preserve 
and promote their culture. 
XXXV ‘The grant by a State of administrative, quasi-official functions to non-governmental associations 
registered in another country constitutes an indirect form of state power: as such, it is not permissible unless 
specifically allowed.’ Venice Commission 2002: Chapter D a/ii. 
XXXVI Art. 1(1) ‘This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian nationality who are 
not Hungarian citizens and who have their residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine...’. 
XXXVII Doc. 9744 rev. 13 May 2003, Preferential treatment of national minorities by the kin-state: the case of 
the Hungarian law of 19 June 2001 on Hungarians living in neighbouring countries 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=10094&Language=EN. 
XXXVIII ‘Sovereignty, Responsibility, and National Minorities,’ Statement by Rolf Ekeus, OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, in The Hague, 26 October 2001. http://www.osce.org/hcnm/53936 
XXXIX ‘Do you think that Parliament should pass a law allowing Hungarian citizenship with preferential 
naturalization to be granted to those, at their request, who claim to have Hungarian nationality, do not live in 
Hungary and are not Hungarian citizens and who prove their Hungarian nationality by means of a ‘Certificate 
of Hungarian Nationality’ issued pursuant to Article 19 of Act LXII of 2001 or in another way to be 
determined by the law which is to be passed?’ www.election.hu cited by Tóth, Kovács 2007: 143. 
XL Opinion 168/2001, Strasbourg, Paper Containing the Position of the Hungarian Government in Relation 
to the Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL%282001%29080-e. 
XLI Excerpt from the speech of Viktor Orbán in the Hungarian Public Radio on 25 April 2004. See the 
website of the chronology of the dual citizenship 
http://www.kettosallampolgarsag.mtaki.hu/kronologia.html 
XLII Art. 3 of the Act XLV of 2010 on the Testimony for National Cohesion. 
http://www.vajma.info/docs/Nemzeti-osszetartozas-torveny.pdf.  
XLIII Art. 4(3) ‘A non-Hungarian citizen who resides in Hungary and declares himself or herself to be of 
Hungarian nationality and whose ascendant was a Hungarian citizen may be naturalized on preferential terms 
upon his or her application in case the conditions defined in Subsection (1) paras b) to e) are satisfied.’ 
XLIV Art. D ‘Bearing in mind that there is one single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall 
bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders, and shall facilitate the survival and 
development of their communities; it shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the 
assertion of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and 
their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary.’ 
XLV Article 7(3) of the Act CCIII of 2011 on the Elections of Members of Parliament allows voters without 
residence in Hungary to vote for one party list. 
XLVI Itself a regional trend, see examples from Croatia, Italy and Romania. Dumbrava 2014. 
XLVII See Szalay Tamás Lajos, 320,000 ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries got Hungarian citizenship 
with voting rights in two years, Budapest Telegraph based on Népszabadság, 
http://www.budapesttelegraph.com/news/285/320_000_ethnic_hungarians_in_neighboring_countries_got_
hungarian_citizenship_with_voting_rights_in_two_years. 
XLVIII See Articles 13-18 of the Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship. 
XLIX Offices of the Democracy Centres http://www.emnt.org/demokracia_kozpontok.html; Decision on 
establishing the Hungarian People’s Party in Transylvania, 
http://www.emnt.org/admin/data/file/20130318/emnp_hatarozat_emnt.pdf. 
L The Political Framework Programme of the Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania 
http://www.neppart.eu/admin/data/file/20120222/keretprogramweb.pdf. 
LI Interview in Cluj with the Head of Secretariat of the office of the People’s Party in August 2011 (on file 
with the authors). 
LII Interview in Cluj with the Executive Director responsible for the financial and organisational matters of 
the National Council in August 2011 (on file with the authors). 
LIII The People’s Party congratulates to the victory of Fidesz and happily undertakes its contribution to it. 
http://www.neppart.eu/az-erdelyi-magyar-neppart-gratulal-a-fidesz-kdnp-valasztasi-gyozelmehez.html 
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LIV See National Election Office, Information on counting the votes delivered by postal ballot for lists, 
Parliamentary Elections, 6 April 2014, http://www.valasztas.hu/dyn/pv14/szavossz/en/levjkv_e.html. This 
includes external nationals voting from other countries, not only Romania. No data is available on a country 
basis. 
LV See numbers work out as follows. There are several millions of ethnic Hungarians living in the countries 
neighbouring Hungary. Around half a million people applied for Hungarian nationality (note that this was 
less at the time of the 2014 elections), 195,338 registered to vote, and 128,429 cast a valid vote. For the 
number on registration, not cited earlier, see National Election Office, Number of registered non-resident 
voters, Parliamentary Elections, 6 April 2014, http://valasztas.hu//hu/ogyv2014/766/766_5_2.html. 
LVI See http://sznt.sic.hu/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=214%3Ahungarian-
government-supports-szekler-county-autonomy&catid=18%3Acikkek-tanulmanyok&Itemid=24&lang=en. 
LVII See the opening statement on the official site of the Hungarian Parliament: parlament.hu: ‘Magyarország 
történelmében ez az első képviselőház, amelyik az általános, titkos és egyenlő választójog alapján az egész 
nemzetet képviseli – azaz, több mint Országgyűlés.’ 
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